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The primary aim of the Danish enterovirus (EV) sur-
veillance system is to document absence of poliovirus 
infection. The conflict in Syria has left many children 
unvaccinated and movement from areas with polio 
cases to Europe calls for increased awareness to detect 
and respond to virus-transmission in a timely manner. 
We evaluate the national EV laboratory surveillance, 
to generate recommendations for system strength-
ening. The system was analysed for completeness of 
viral typing analysis and clinical information and time-
liness of specimen collection, laboratory results and 
reporting of clinical information. Of 23,720 specimens 
screened, 2,202 (9.3%) were EV-positive. Submission 
of cerebrospinal fluid and faecal specimens from pri-
mary diagnostic laboratories was 79.5% complete 
(845/1,063), and varied by laboratory and patient age. 
EV genotypes were determined in 68.5% (979/1,430) 
of laboratory-confirmed cases, clinical information 
was available for 63.1% (903/1,430). Primary diagnos-
tic results were available after a median of 1.4 days, 
typing results after 17 days, detailed clinical informa-
tion after 33 days. The large number of samples typed 
demonstrated continued monitoring of EV-circulation 
in Denmark. The system could be strengthened by 
increasing the collection of supplementary faecal 
specimens, improving communication with primary 
diagnostic laboratories, adapting the laboratory typ-
ing methodology and collecting clinical information 
with electronic forms.
Introduction
Human enteroviruses (EV) is a diverse group of single-
stranded RNA-viruses from the Enterovirus genus of 
the Picornaviridae family that includes polioviruses. A 
number of EVs are among the most common viral infec-
tious agents in humans, with the majority of infections 
being asymptomatic or mild [1]. However, infection with 
EV can lead to a wide spectrum of symptoms including; 
upper respiratory illness, febrile rash, aseptic menin-
gitis, pleurodynia, encephalitis, neonatal sepsis-like 
disease and acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) which may 
indicate poliomyelitis [1-3].
The World Health Organisation (WHO) announced the 
European Region as poliovirus free in 2002 [4]. In 2013 
when only three countries had endemic circulation of 
poliovirus, namely Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria, 
circulation of wild-type poliovirus was detected in 
three new regions: Syria, the Horn of Africa, and Israel 
[5-7]. Due to this recent transmission of poliovirus com-
bined-+ with the armed conflict in Syria and the move-
ment of refugees from this region, there is an increased 
risk for importation of poliovirus into Europe [7,8]. 
Considering this risk, there are currently concerns in 
the European Union (EU) and European Economic Area 
(EEA) over the quality of EV surveillance, in particu-
lar the capacity of countries to detect and respond to 
poliovirus transmission in a timely manner [9,10]. The 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) therefore advised in a 2014 technical report, 
entitled ’Detection and control of poliovirus transmis-
sion in the European Union and European Economic 
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Area’, EU/EEA countries should assess the quality of 
their poliovirus surveillance and determine whether it 
needs to be strengthened [9]. A surveillance system 
allowing for rapid detection and a short time between 
specimen collection and outbreak response, would 
permit reducing transmission faster, while a slower 
response would conversely be associated with more 
widespread-transmission and therefore a greater cost 
and effort of containment [11]. This project aimed to 
address these points with regards to aspects of polio-
virus surveillance currently operating in Denmark; the 
laboratory EV surveillance system and collection of 
detailed EV clinical information.
Poliomyelitis is a mandatorily notifiable disease in 
Denmark and a laboratory surveillance system based 
at the Danish National WHO Reference Laboratory for 
poliovirus (NRL) at Statens Serum Institut (SSI), in col-
laboration with the Danish clinical microbiology labora-
tories (Klinisk Mikrobiologisk Afdeling (KMA)), ensures 
year-round surveillance of all cases of EV-positive 
aseptic meningitis. The laboratory surveillance sys-
tem is case-based and covers the entire population of 
Denmark; including all general practitioners (GPs), all 
hospitals and all KMAs. The system was initially set up 
as a component of the national poliomyelitis eradica-
tion plan, with the main objective of documenting the 
absence of poliovirus transmission in Denmark. This 
surveillance system collects data on EV to the genotype 
Figure 1
Flowchart of the laboratory surveillance system for enterovirus in Denmark, routes of specimen flow, clinical information 
collection, databases and international reporting.
GPs Hospitals
MiBa
KMANRL at SSI
SSI IDED WHO EURO
NRL-EV
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services
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EV: enterovirus; GPs: general practitioners; IDED: Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology; KMA: hospital clinical microbiological 
laboratory; MiBa: the Danish national microbiological database; NRL; Danish National WHO Reference Laboratory for poliovirus; SSI: 
Statens Serum Institut; WHO EURO: World Health Organization Regional office for Europe
Specimens are sent for primary diagnostics to a KMA or directly to SSI. All data from the KMA and SSI are entered MiBa, all data from SSI is 
also entered into the NRL-EV database. The NRL reports new EV cases to the IDED. Reporting was monthly up until 2011 and weekly from 
2012. The SSI IDED collects detailed clinical information with a letter and standardised questionnaire sent to the patient’s hospital or GP. 
Returned questionnaires are entered into the clinical database by the IDED. Reporting to WHO EURO is carried out on a weekly from the 
reference laboratory; information is submitted for one sample per patient per day of sample collection. Reporting to WHO-EURO is yearly 
from the IDED.
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level, as well as patient demographic information and 
clinical details; including symptoms, presentation with 
AFP and date of symptom onset. With this informa-
tion the system also serves the objective to monitor 
national trends in circulating EV.
The surveillance system consists only of EV surveil-
lance, is run on a voluntary basis and involves com-
ponents that are passive, and there are consequently 
concerns with regards to underreporting. It has never 
been evaluated, and the completeness and timeliness 
are unknown.
The overall aims of the study were to describe the EV 
surveillance system and to determine whether it meets 
its surveillance objectives. In order to achieve this, 
we assessed the surveillance system and its charac-
teristics, described the data sources, data providers, 
flow of diagnostic specimens, and mapped the routes 
of reporting to the national level and to WHO Regional 
office for Europe (WHO EURO). Hereafter, we evaluated 
the EV surveillance system for the attributes complete-
ness and timeliness and made recommendations for 
improvements to the current system with regards to 
Figure 2
Time intervals in the reporting of laboratory confirmed enterovirus cases in Denmark
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Date of sample collection 
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Date of reporting to national/ 
international level
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(d)
EV: enterovirus; GP: general practitioner; IDED: Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology; KMA: hospital clinical microbiological 
laboratory; NRL: Danish National WHO Reference Laboratory for poliovirus; SSI: Statens Serum Institut; WHO EURO: WHO Regional office for 
Europe.
aCould be calculated for 2013 only, relevant dates were not available before 2013.
The timeliness of interval (a) and (b) were calculated from the clinical database. For specimens where primary diagnostic was carried out 
at SSI, the intervals (c) and (d) were calculated from the NRL-EV database. For specimens where primary diagnostic was carried out at a 
KMA (e) was calculated from the NRL-EV database. For all samples subject to typing analysis the time interval (f) was calculated from the 
BioNumerics database and files containing sequencing run history, and was the time interval between arrival at the reference laboratory 
and the date when the first sequence result was obtained. The final time interval, (g) symptom onset to reporting of clinical symptoms to 
the department of epidemiology was calculated from the clinical database
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firstly, documenting the absence of poliovirus trans-
mission and secondly monitoring national trends in EV 
circulation.
Methods
Routes of reporting
The Danish EV surveillance system is run collabora-
tively by the NRL at the Department of Microbiological 
Diagnostics and Virology (MDV), SSI and the 
Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology (IDED), 
at SSI. Although the system is voluntary it is highly 
recommended that EV-positive faecal or cerebrospi-
nal fluid (CSF) specimens from patients with asep-
tic meningitis are sent to SSI. Between July 2014 and 
January 2015, interviews were conducted with staff of 
the NRL, IDED and the WHO EURO group lead for the 
Regional Laboratory Networks. Questions were asked 
in regards to the laboratory practices; the diagnostic 
and genotyping workflow and the surveillance system 
infrastructure; data sources, analysis and outputs. 
Finally, questions were asked about the system routes 
of reporting.
Laboratory identification and typing of 
enteroviruses
Interviews were additionally conducted in November 
2014 with section chiefs or laboratory personnel 
responsible for EV testing, at the primary diagnostic 
level, at the KMAs. All 11 of the national KMAs were 
invited to take part in the study, either by telephone or 
by a paper-based questionnaire. Seven of the eleven 
KMAs took part in the interviews.
Four KMAs did not respond to the invitation for a tel-
ephone interview and did not return the paper ques-
tionnaire. Three of these KMAs: Mid-Vest, Esbjerg and 
Vejle did not test for EV during the study period. Only 
one of the non-respondent KMAs, Odense, did test for 
EV during the study period.
Questions were asked to ascertain whether the labo-
ratories carried out EV testing and if so by what tech-
niques. Additionally, KMAs were asked what criteria 
they followed for selecting specimens for forwarding to 
SSI.
Evaluation the surveillance system
The CDC ‘Updated guidelines for evaluating a public 
health surveillance system’ were used as a framework 
for the evaluation [12]. Completeness and timeliness 
were chosen as surveillance performance indicators 
for the analysis.
Data sources
Several central data sources were accessed for this 
evaluation and are outlined in Figure 1. Briefly, speci-
mens are sent for primary diagnostics to a KMA or 
directly to SSI. Not all KMAs have the capacity to test 
for EV therefore specimens for EV testing may be for-
warded directly to SSI or to another KMA. If a specimen 
is found EV-positive at a KMA it can be sent to the 
NRL for viral typing. Laboratory data for all EV pri-
mary diagnostic testing are contained in the Danish 
national microbiological database (MiBa). An extract 
was obtained from MiBa for all EV-positive serologi-
cal, culture and RNA-based diagnostic tests and their 
results from 2010 to 2013. Details relating to labora-
tory testing carried out by the NRL are stored in the 
SSI laboratory information and management system 
(LIMS). All entries coded as EV culture, diagnostic PCR, 
and typing PCR were extracted from LIMS for the period 
of 01 January 2010 to 31 December 2013. This dataset is 
called the NRL-EV database herein.
Information on sequencing results for all EV-positive 
specimens typed at SSI for the corresponding study 
period was obtained in from an extract of the NRL 
sequencing results database, which is maintained 
with BioNumerics software and herein called the NRL-
sequencing database.
The NRL reports new EV cases to the IDED, who in turn 
collects clinical information with a letter and standard-
ised paper-based questionnaire sent to the patient’s 
hospital or GP, and collects details on patient’s symp-
toms in particular neurological symptoms including 
acute flaccid paralysis. The letter also reminds clini-
cians to send faecal samples from the patient to the 
NRL for characterisation.
The collected clinical data are stored in a database 
internally at the IDED. All entries in this clinical infor-
mation database corresponding to the years 2010 to 
2013 were extracted.
Data linkage between the various databases was pos-
sible and efficient due to the use of the Danish civil 
registry number (CPR numbers) as a unique identifier. 
This number is used in all four databases.
Completeness of the surveillance system
Completeness was assessed for the first component 
of the laboratory-based surveillance system; the for-
warding of EV-positive specimens from primary diag-
nostic facilities to the NRL. All specimens that tested 
EV-positive on primary diagnosis, present in the MiBa 
database, were overlapped with the NRL-EV dataset, 
containing those specimens forwarded to SSI. If multi-
ple specimens were taken from the same patient only 
one overlapping specimen was needed for all speci-
mens associated with the patient to be considered 
overlapping. Samples were considered overlapping if 
there was no more than a 14 day difference between 
the sampling dates indicated in the two databases. 
If more than one specimen was collected from the 
same patient on the same day, only one was counted 
in the analysis. The proportion of specimens positive 
in MiBa present in the NRL-EV dataset was calculated 
as the performance indicator. This calculation was per-
formed for CSF and faecal specimen types only, and 
repeated for all specimen types that were submitted 
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for EV surveillance; faecal samples, CFS, blood, serum, 
plasma, biopsy, swabs, bronchoalveolar lavage, 
expectorate, naso-pharyngeal secretions, pulmonary 
secretions, pericardial fluid, pus, saliva and urine. 
Results were stratified by primary diagnostic labora-
tory, patient age and analysed for statistical differ-
ences using a Chi-squared test. The completeness over 
the test period was analysed for trends using Poisson 
regression. Binomial proportion 95% confidence inter-
vals (CIs) were calculated.
Secondly, the completeness of the typing analysis car-
ried out at the NRL was determined. A dataset extracted 
from the NRL-EV database corresponding to all sam-
ples that were EV-positive was overlapped to the NRL-
sequencing database, containing typing results. The 
Figure 3
Flowchart of the laboratory diagnostic workflow, for the surveillance of enterovirus in Denmark
Specimen collection 
Tissue culture
Molecular typing
Report:
EV-negative
Report:
EV non-typeable
Sequencing
No culture Viral culture
Positive for EV Negative
Positive
VP2 PCR [15] 
Negative
VP1 PCR [16] 
Positive Negative
Report:
EV and subtype
Report:
Results of PCR
Poliovirus-specificL20B
CaCo2 
RD
Primary diagnostic
At SSI At KMA
Commercial kits or in-house EV-specific PCR [14] 
Faecal specimens
All specimen types
CSF: cerebrospinal fluid; EV: enterovirus; KMA: hospital clinical microbiological laboratory; SSI: Statens Serum Institut
KMAs differ in their methods for primary diagnostics. At SSI primary diagnostics is carried out with a multiplex real-time PCR. A reverse-
transcriptase PCR targeting the VP2 capsid protein is the primary EV typing assay. If VP2 typing fails, a reverse-transcriptase semi-nested 
PCR targeting the VP1 capsid protein is used. PCR amplicons are sequenced. All faecal specimens, as well as CSF and other specimens 
where PCR has failed are subject to viral cultivation assays. Specimens are cultured in three cell lines, two poliovirus specific cell lines; L20 
and RD and one cell line for the non-specific cultivation of EV, CaCO2. Positive viral cultures are then subject to the EV typing workflow. If a 
typing result was obtained from either VP2 or VP1 the results are reported as EV and the genotype is given. If no product is obtained from 
either assay the isolate is reported as EV non-typeable. If poliovirus is detected from the cultivation process, further characterisation based 
on virus neutralisation as well as RT-PCR will be applied to determine the poliovirus type as well as to discriminate between wild-type or 
vaccine-derived poliovirus, respectively.
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performance indicator was the number of EV-positive 
specimens subject to typing analysis over the total 
number of EV-positives. The completeness of the geno-
type result was also determined; and the performance 
indicator was the total number of specimens where a 
subtype could be determined over the total number of 
EV-positive specimens.
Thirdly, completeness of the clinical data (e.g. symp-
toms of CNS affection, paralysis etc) for EV-positive 
cases was determined by comparing the number of 
patients with clinical information available to the num-
ber of patients with no clinical information available. 
An extract was made of the NRL-EV dataset containing 
all EV-positive cases. This was overlapped with the 
clinical information database. The performance indica-
tor was the number of EV-positive cases where detailed 
clinical information was collected over the total num-
ber of EV-positive cases. The results were stratified 
for patient age and analysed for statistical differences 
using a Chi-squared test. The completeness by year was 
analysed for a trend with Poisson regression. Binomial 
proportion 95% CIs were calculated.
Timeliness of the surveillance system
The time intervals between six steps in the surveil-
lance system were evaluated using various time vari-
ables from the four databases described above. The 
six steps (a) to (g) are outlined in Figure 2. Intervals 
for steps (a) to (e) and (g) were calculated for the years 
2010 to 2013, intervals for step (f) could be calculated 
for 2013 only, dates were unavailable for the previous 
years. The time intervals were calculated in days. For 
each time interval the median, 25% and 75% quartiles 
and the interquartile range (IQR) were calculated using 
STATA V12.1 software. The timeliness calculations were 
stratified for patient age, geographical location, hos-
pital of patient origin, laboratory of primary diagnostic 
and laboratory result. Strata were compared for differ-
ences with a one-way analysis of variance. Trends in 
the timeliness values over the test period were ana-
lysed with linear regression.
Table 1
Completeness of EV-positive CSF and faecal specimen forwarding from primary diagnostic laboratories to the National 
Reference Laboratory; by year, patient age and primary diagnostic laboratory, Denmark, 2010–2013 (n=2,202)
Positive 
specimensa
Sent to reference 
laboratory
Not sent to reference 
laboratoryb
Percentage 
Completeness (%)
95% Confidence 
Intervals
All sample types 
Total number of specimens 2,202 1,712 490 77.7 75.9-79.4
CSF and faecal specimens 
Total number of specimens 1,063 845 218 79.5 76.9-81.8
KMA of primary diagnosticc 
Aalborg 22 10 12 45.5 26.9-65.3
Herlev/ Hillerød/ Hvidovre 103 45 58 43.7 34.5-53.3
Odense 216 203 13 94.0 89.9-96.4
Region Sjælland 15 11 4 73.3 48.1-89.1
Rigshospitalet 70 39 31 55.7 44.1-66.7
SSId 377 377 0 100 98.9-100
Aarhus 249 151 98 60.6e 54.5-66.5
Sønderborg 11 9 2 81.8 52.3-94.8
Patient agec 
Less than one year 293 258 35 88.1 83.8-91.2
Aged 1 year or older 770 587 183 76.2 73.1-79.1
Year 
2010 227 185 42 81.5 75.9-86.0
2011 314 267 47 85.1 80.6-88.6
2012 305 244 61 80.0 75.1-84.1
2013 217 149 68 68.7 62.2-74.4
KMA: hospital clinical microbiological laboratory; SSI: Statens Serum Institut.
aThe calculation counts one specimen per patient per 14 days (specimens taken within a 14-day period are considered to be relating to the 
same episode of illness).
bThis value reflects different practices in the KMAs, including differences in the selection criteria for sending specimens where low volume 
remains following the KMA’s primary diagnostic workflow.
cIndicates groups where completeness values were statistically different between strata
dThe SSI primary diagnostic laboratory and the NRL are located in the same building
eAll specimens are checked, and only those with sufficient material are sent to the NRL.
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Surveillance standards
Surveillance standards were based on those for AFP 
along with the objectives of the EV surveillance system 
[13,14]. The following surveillance standards were con-
sidered acceptable for the system:
≥ 80% of positive CSF or faecal specimens, determined 
on primary diagnostics should be submitted to the NRL 
for viral typing;
• ≥ 80% of positive CSF or faecal specimens, should 
arrive at the NRL within 7 days of specimen 
collection;
• the final laboratory typing result should be available 
for ≥ 80% of specimens within 28 days of sample 
arrival;
• clinical information should be collected for ≥ 80% of 
cases with a positive specimen sample.
Results
Surveillance system structure and laboratory 
workflow
From the interviews the structure of the system, includ-
ing specimen flow, data flow, databases and routes of 
reporting was elucidated (Figure 1).
At the six KMAs that were interviewed, the EV primary 
diagnostics differed in terms of assays used and range 
of sample material they had capacity to test. One of 
the interviewed KMAs did not test for EV, four of the 
KMAs used a commercial, automated real-time mul-
tiplex reverse transcription-PCR for the diagnosis of 
EV from CSF, but did not test other sample materials. 
One KMA used an in-house PCR for all sample mate-
rials. In all cases KMAs sent positive CSF samples to 
SSI and supplementary faecal samples from the posi-
tive patients should also be sent to SSI. Interviews 
elucidated different practices locally at the KMAs 
with regards to criteria for sending low-volume CSF 
specimens to the NRL. Some KMAs sent all specimens 
including low volume whereas others did not. These 
differences impacted on the completeness values.
Specimens from all regions of Denmark were sent to 
SSI for primary diagnostics. Primary diagnosis at SSI 
was carried out with a one-step multiplex real-time PCR 
as described by Nielsen et al. in 2013 [15].
VP2 and VP1 regions of EV-positive specimens were 
PCR amplified, as described by Nasri et al. and Nix et 
al., respectively [16,17]. Amplicons from these PCRs 
were sequenced and genotypes obtained by sequence 
comparisons within the NRL-sequencing database, and 
the NCBI, using the BLAST software. Genotyping was 
carried out at the NRL only. The laboratory workflow for 
EV typing at SSI is outlined in Figure 3.
Surveillance data
During the study period a total of 23,720 samples were 
tested for EV in Denmark; 9.3% (2,202/23,720) were 
positive. Of these samples 16,538 (931 positive sam-
ples) were tested at KMAs while 7,182 (1,271 positive 
samples) were submitted directly for testing at SSI.
A total of 10,945 CSF specimens were tested, 7.7% 
(844/10,945) were EV-positive; of 2,211 tested fae-
cal specimens, 9.9% (219/2,211) were EV-positive; 
17.6% (149/844) positive CSF specimens had a fae-
cal submitted for analysis also. The remaining 10,564 
samples, comprised blood, serum, plasma, biopsies, 
swabs, pulmonary secretions, pericardial fluid, pus, 
Table 2 
Completeness of patient clinical information for enterovirus-positive specimens, by year and age for all sample types, 
Denmark, 2010–2013 (n=1,430)
Total no. positive 
specimens
Total no. clinical information 
collected
Total no. clinical 
information not collected
Percentage 
completeness (%)
95% Confidence 
Intervals
All cases 1,430 933 497 65.1 62.7-67.7
Year 
2010 318 270 48 84.9 80.6-88.4
2011 285 92 193 32.3 27.1-37.9
2012 452 263 189 58.2 53.6-62.7
2013 375 308 67 82.1 77.9-85.7
Patient agea 
Less than 
one year of 
age
948 605 343 63.8 60.7-66.8
Aged 1 
year or 
older
482 328 154 68.0 63.8-72.1
aIndicates groups where completeness values were statistically different between strata
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saliva and urine and unknown sample types and 10.4% 
(1,106/10,564) were EV-positive.
During VP2 and VP1 amplification and subsequent typ-
ing and alignment, no poliovirus (wild-type or vaccine-
derived) was detected.
Completeness
Submission of EV-positive specimens to the National 
Reference Laboratory
The completeness of submission of EV-positive speci-
mens to NRL for further characterisation was 77.7% for 
all specimen types (1,712/ 2,202 positive specimens) 
(Table 1). For CSF or faecal specimens, completeness 
of 79.5% was obtained (834/1,063 positive specimens) 
(Table 1).
There was no increasing or decreasing trend in the num-
bers of CSF or faecal specimens forwarded to the NRL 
over the four years). However, the completeness varied 
by year and was above the adopted surveillance stand-
ard cut-off of ≥ 80% in three of the years and was below 
the cut-off in 2013 only (Table 1). The level of complete-
ness also varied according to the location of primary 
diagnostics; the KMA of sample origin, (p-value < 0.001), 
and was above the surveillance standard of ≥ 80% for 
three KMAs (Table 1). Some KMAs check the samples 
for sufficient material before sending them to the NRL 
and withhold samples that would not be processed 
further by the NRL. Thus, the number of EV-positive 
specimens evaluated by the KMAs is higher than those 
actually sent to the NRL. The completeness of this step 
for all samples, including those with too little sample 
material remaining, was significantly higher, and above 
the surveillance standard threshold, for patients aged 
one year or younger compared with those older than 
one year, (p-value < 0.001) (Table 1).
EV genotyping carried out at the National Reference 
Laboratory
There were 1,430 EV-positive specimens in the NRL-EV 
database; 863 following primary diagnostic at SSI and 
567 from KMAs. Of these, 1,344 were genotyped, 86 
specimens were not genotyped because they lacked 
sufficient sample material. All samples where suffi-
cient material remained following primary diagnosis 
were subject to genotyping. The completeness of this 
component of the surveillance system was therefore 
94.0% (1,344/1,430). Of these, no amplicon could be 
obtained with the genotyping PCR for a total of 365 
specimens; they were therefore reported as non-type-
able EV. The completeness of a final genotyping result 
was therefore 68.5% (979/1,430).
Detailed clinical information for entereovirus-positive 
cases
Completeness of detailed clinical information for 
EV-positive cases over the four year period was deter-
mined as 65.2% (Table 2). Although there was no trend 
in the completeness detected over the four year period, 
the completeness of this step varied throughout the 
years; two years 2010 and 2013 were above the surveil-
lance standard while the values for 2011 and 2012 were 
well below the standard (Table 2). The collection of 
detailed clinical information was not different for cases 
over and under one year of age.
Timeliness
The median timeliness of the six steps in the surveil-
lance system is summarised in Table 3. The median 
for the first interval symptom onset and presentation 
to the health system was significantly shortened for 
cases under 1 year of age; with a median of 1 day (IQR 0 
to 2 days), compared with cases aged one year or over, 
with a median of 2 (IQR 1 to 4 days, p-value 0.024. The 
timeliness of presentation to the health system to the 
collection of a specimen for laboratory testing did not 
vary by patient age, or between hospitals. The interval 
for the time taken for transport of a specimen from the 
healthcare facility to SSI varied by geographical loca-
tion, (p-value < 0.001), and was shorter for samples 
from facilities within the Capital region, where the NRL 
is located, median of 1.02 days (IQR 0.8 to 2.9) and was 
longer for samples from regions further from the NRL 
laboratory, with the longest from North-Jutland, median 
of 1.93 days (IQR 1.10–3.10). However, overall 98.1% 
(7,809/7,691) of the specimens arrived at the NRL labo-
ratory within 7 days of sample collection. The interval 
for the time for specimens to be transferred to a KMA, 
for primary diagnostics to be carried out and for posi-
tive samples to then be forwarded to the NRL also met 
the surveillance standards, with 80.6% (1,094/1,357) 
of submitted specimens arriving at the NRL within 7 
days of sample collection. For these samples the KMA 
of origin and relevant dates was known for 644 speci-
mens, and the interval differed significantly between 
the various KMAs, p-value < 0.001, the shortest interval 
recorded, had a median of 1 (IQR 0.80 to 3) and the 
longest had a median of 31.5 days (IQR 0.91–92.64). 
Five of the KMAs met the surveillance standard, how-
ever two did not, with 62.6% (47/75) and 71.4% (5/7) of 
specimens arriving at the NRL within 7 days. The timeli-
ness of step (f) sample arrival to results of viral geno-
typing could be calculated for 2013, results for 82.5% 
(193/234) of specimens were available within 28 days.
The final time interval was described before symp-
tom onset and reporting of clinical symptoms to IDED. 
There was no difference between patients aged over 
and under one. There was a decreasing trend detected 
in the value of the interval overtime (p-value < 0.001). 
The year with the longest interval for the collection 
of clinical data was 2011, with a median of 100 days 
(IQR 60-183), decreasing to a median of 19 (IQR 5-42) 
in 2013.
Discussion
This study aimed to review the Danish EV surveil-
lance system and determine whether the system fulfils 
its objective to document the absence of poliovirus 
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transmission in Denmark and monitor genotypes of EV 
in circulation.
From 2010 to 2013, the EV laboratory surveillance sys-
tem performed detailed surveillance of EV in circula-
tion in Denmark; over 20,000 specimens were tested 
with the primary aim of documenting the absence of 
poliovirus transmission. No wild-type poliovirus was 
detected during this period. The laboratory system 
has the ability to detect the occurrence of a poliovi-
rus infection; ensured by poliovirus proficiency pan-
els from WHO correctly serotyped through this system 
within a 14-day time period, following WHO guidelines 
[18]. The surveillance system additionally gathers the 
necessary information to facilitate an investigation if 
a case of poliomyelitis occurs. As a secondary objec-
tive this surveillance system also monitors the circu-
lating EV genotypes in Denmark and allows to study 
long-term patterns and epidemiological characteris-
tics of EV transmission and it facilitates the detection 
of outbreaks through analysing data for individual 
genotypes. In addition, the data collected by this sys-
tem enables the identification of molecular targets for 
the development of more specific diagnostic assays 
should they be required, for examples in the case of an 
outbreak as demonstrated by recent investigation on 
EV outbreaks in Denmark [3,19,20].
The second part of this study aimed to evaluate the EV 
surveillance system from 2010 to 2013. Firstly, the com-
pleteness was determined as a means to whether the 
data collected was meaningful and included the entire 
population that should be covered by the surveillance 
system [9,10]. Secondly, the timeliness was calculated 
to detect time-delays in the system, and the identifica-
tion of factors associated with this delay [21].
The initial step of the EV surveillance system, the for-
warding of EV-positive specimens for further viral char-
acterisation from KMAs to the NRL, is a passive step in 
the surveillance system and therefore a major concern 
with regards to the data completeness of the system 
[22]. This evaluation documented that the forwarding 
of EV-positive CSF and faecal specimens to the NRL 
for viral typing was overall just short of the surveil-
lance standard specified for the completeness of this 
step. However, some KMAs participate in the sorting of 
samples and only send samples with sufficient mate-
rial for further processing at the NRL. The timeliness 
of this step was however, despite difference between 
various regions of Denmark, within the surveillance 
standards for all regions. When the completeness and 
timeliness values were stratified a number of factors 
associated with underreporting were identified. The 
completeness value varied between the KMAs meeting 
the surveillance standard in some of the laboratories 
and not in others. Similarly, there were differences in 
the timeliness values between the various KMAs, rang-
ing from the shortest median of 0.8 days to the longest 
of 31.5 days. Differences in surveillance performance 
on a sub-national level, have been reported on pre-
viously in AFP surveillance in the United States (US). 
In the US, regional reporting was also variable and in 
some instances did not fulfil the surveillance stand-
ards, even though the national system on a whole did 
so [23]. The difference in the distribution of samples 
from the various KMAs indicated that the surveillance 
of EV may not be representative of EV circulation in the 
entire Denmark. The quality of the data obtained in this 
initial step of the surveillance will determine the repre-
sentativeness at all subsequent stages [22]. Therefore, 
improved forwarding of samples and supplementary 
faecal sampling from patients with too little residual 
material in the primary sample would allow for a more 
representative and timely system.
Furthermore, the completeness was significantly 
higher for patients one year or younger as compared 
with those older than one year of age, meeting the sur-
veillance standard for those one year or younger only. 
Often, EV infections in younger patients tend to be 
associated with a more severe illness and a specific 
diagnosis considered more urgent; specimens from 
younger patients tend to be submitted for laboratory 
testing more frequently [24,25]. This age-based sur-
veillance bias was similarly reported in the US [24]. 
Table 3
Value of examined time intervals in days, enterovirus laboratory surveillance system, Denmark, 2010–2013
Interval description N Median days (IQR)
From symptom onset and presentation to the health system (a) 497 1 (0–3)
From presentation to the health system to the collection of a specimen (b) 475 1 (0–2)
From specimen taking to arrival at the reference laboratory for primary diagnostic (c) 7,961 1.4 (0.9–2.5)
From sample arrival to results of the primary EV diagnostic laboratory test (d) 7,961 1.3 (1–3)
From specimen taking to arrival at the reference laboratory for typing analysis (e) 1,378 3 (1–5)
From sample arrival to results of viral typinga(f) 1,378 17 (11–26)
From symptom onset and reporting of clinical symptoms to the department of epidemiology (g) 770 33 (17–63)
IQR, 25–75% interquartile range
a-g: Time intervals as indicated in figure 2.
aData for 2013 only.
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These results indicate that in order to obtain a more 
representative overview of EV circulation an increased 
awareness in the importance of forwarding specimens 
from older patients is needed by clinicians and primary 
diagnostic laboratories.
The completeness of the second step of the surveil-
lance system was adequate. All specimens where suffi-
cient quantity remained after primary diagnosis, above 
90%, were subject to genotyping. However, since the 
completeness of the first step of the surveillance sys-
tem was 79.5%, the percentage of the total number of 
EV-positive specimens subject to viral typing analysis 
was closer to 75% and would increase if more speci-
mens were forwarded to the NRL.
The timeliness met the surveillance standard with a 
median time interval between specimen arrival and 
a typing result of between two and three weeks. The 
overall aim of the viral typing is not for the real-time 
detection of outbreaks but rather to document the 
absence of poliovirus transmission along with the 
detection of general trends in the circulation of EV. The 
system has met its surveillance objective for EV and 
poliomyelitis, and enabled the detection of recent out-
breaks of EV 71 and D-68 [3,16]. However, our results 
highlighted a high proportion of > 25% of non-type-
able EV among EV positive samples sent to the NRL. 
The proportion of non-typeable isolates is thought to 
vary by sample type and typing may be more success-
ful for faecal samples. A somewhat high proportion of 
non-typeable EV specimens reported in studies that 
include many sample types is not unusual and has 
been reported previously [26,27]. This study therefore 
demonstrated that virus genotyping procedures, need 
to be improved to increase the number of EV where an 
amplicon can be obtained to increase the typing result-
completeness rate.
The final aspect of the surveillance system to be evalu-
ated was the collection of clinical information in rela-
tion to neurological symptoms from EV-positive cases, 
as an indicator of potential poliomyelitis. Our results 
show that the collection of this information was below 
the target ≥ 80% over the four-year period. However, 
the completeness varied by year and was lowest during 
2011. An explanation for the low value that year was 
that there was a shortage of staff at SSI in 2011. This 
resulted in a backlog in laboratory testing and a delayed 
reporting to IDED. A decision was taken not to collect 
detailed clinical information from cases confirmed as 
EV-positive, where specimen collection had taken place 
more than 6 months previously, therefore negatively 
impacting the completeness of data obtained. The sys-
tem was revised hereafter, and reporting from the NRL 
to IDED was changed from monthly to weekly in 2012. 
The completeness subsequently increased and it was 
above the surveillance standard for 2013. There was 
however, a long time interval associated with the col-
lection of clinical information (median 2–3 weeks). The 
current system is paper-based, and requires clinicians 
to fill in a standardised form and return it by post to 
SSI. This time interval could be shortened if it would be 
replaced by an electronic system, as has been demon-
strated for numerous other systems [28-30].
This study demonstrated that there were a number of 
factors that could be addressed to improve the current 
laboratory EV surveillance system with regards to its 
primary objective to document the absence of poliovi-
rus transmission. A detailed report on results of this 
study will be directly communicated to all KMAs, to 
ensure that all laboratories are aware of the national 
recommendation to forward positive CSF and faecal 
samples to the NRL. This report will highlight the fact 
that specimens should be sent as soon as possible 
after the primary diagnostic result, and that specimens 
from patients of all ages should be forwarded for viral 
characterisation to rule out infections with poliovi-
rus. This fact will also be communicated to clinicians 
to ensure the importance of collecting faecal samples 
from EV-positive patients is understood. In addition, a 
dialogue between the NRL and the KMAs is required to 
ensure the NRL is fully aware of the selection criteria 
for sending specimens at all the KMA. A modification of 
the surveillance system to collect clinical information 
on EV-positive cases, from a paper-based to an elec-
tronic system is additionally suggested as a means to 
improve the timeliness of the system.
To improve the representativeness of the EV surveil-
lance in Denmark with regards the secondary surveil-
lance objective to track circulating EV genotypes, a 
decrease is needed in the proportion of isolates where 
a non-typeable result is reported. A revision of the 
laboratory work flow is currently ongoing to address 
this issue and is focussed on redesigning the assay to 
first differentiate between species A-D and secondly to 
develop sequencing primers specific for each species.
Conclusion
The current laboratory surveillance system for EV in 
Denmark is an important tool to document the absence 
of poliovirus transmission in the country as well as 
informing public health officials about nationwide 
alterations in EV trends. The system is currently oper-
ating within all but one of the surveillance objectives 
adopted for this study. Due to the increased risk of 
an imported poliomyelitis case in Europe, it is recom-
mended to improve certain steps in the EV surveillance 
system with regards to timeliness and representative-
ness. Specifically, an increased awareness might result 
in increased focus and participation of some KMAs, a 
revision of the EV typing laboratory methodology to 
decrease the number of non-typeable EV. Finally, the 
collection of stool and detailed clinical information in 
case of any EV-positive CSF should be organised in a 
manner to make it easy for the clinician and the patient 
to collect and send the material. For example, the use 
of an immediate electronic prompting system would 
address these issues and optimise the surveillance 
system with regards to its objectives.
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